[I found this article quite true in its observations of who the 20-to-30-years-old in China really are]
In 2004, fresh off the plane in Beijing, I was asked to judge an
English competition for high-school seniors. My two co-judges were
pleasantly cynical middle-aged sociologists, both professors at Tsinghua
University. After listening to the umpteenth speech about how China
used to be poor, but was now rich and powerful, I remarked to one of
them that the students seemed a little sheltered.
‘They don’t know anything!’ she spat. ‘They don’t have any idea about
how people live. None of this generation do. They’re all so spoilt.’
It’s a view I’ve heard time and again over the past eight years, and
one of which the Chinese media never tire. The young get it from left
and right. This January alone, the jingoistic Major General and media
commentator Luo Yuan condemned the young for being physically and
mentally unfit, ranting: ‘Femininity is on the rise, and masculinity is
on the decline. With such a lack of character and determination and such
physical weakness, how can they shoulder the heavy responsibility?’
Meanwhile the writer and social critic Murong Xuecun blasted them in the
US magazine
Foreign Policy because ‘fattened to the point of
obesity with Coca-Cola and hamburgers [ ...] the young generation only
believes official pronouncements; some even think contradicting the
official line is heretical. They do not bother to check the details’.
There’s a measure of truth in these criticisms. The year I arrived,
when I was going through the near-obligatory expat period as a teacher
before becoming a full-time writer and editor, I had to forcibly drag a
19-year-old out of a classroom after he threw a temper tantrum, drummed
the floor and refused to leave. Murong’s claim that the young
unwittingly swallow government statements doesn’t stand up in an era
where official credibility has been shattered by social media tools, but
one can see where Luo’s claims are coming from. Ironically, the
children of army officers seem especially pudgy. The teachers at a
senior academy attached to an army base described their bullet-headed
charges to me as looking like ‘stubby wobbling penises,’ and held
private competitions as to which student was the most ‘sausagey’.
Food metaphors are telling — older Chinese want to know: ‘Why do they
have it so easy, when we had it so hard?’ The main target of this
slating has been what the Chinese call the
balinghou — young
people who were born after 1980, who never knew food rationing and were
raised after China’s ‘reform and opening’ began. I’m talking here of the
urban middle class, who dominate Chinese media both as purchasers and
consumers. The raft of criticisms being levelled has very little to do
with the actual failings of the young, but is a symptom of the yawning,
and unprecedented gulf between young urban Chinese and their parents.
Zhang Jun, a 26-year-old PhD student, described the situation: ‘It’s
not just a generation gap. It’s a values gap, a wealth gap, an education
gap, a relationships gap, an information gap.’ Lin Meilian, 30, and a
journalist, bluntly stated: ‘I have nothing in common with my mother. We
can’t talk about anything. She doesn’t understand how I choose to live
my life.’
Parents who spent their own twenties labouring on remote
farms have children who measure their world in malls, iPhones, and
casual dates
This kind of distance is not unique to China. But most other
countries can claim far greater continuity between generations. My
adolescence in Manchester in the 1990s was different in degree, not in
kind, from that of my parents in Bristol and Sydney in the 1960s. But
the parents of China’s post-1980 generation (themselves born between
1950 and 1965) grew up in a rural, Maoist world utterly different from
that of their children. In their adolescence, there was one phone per
village, the universities were closed and jobs were assigned from above.
If you imagine the disorientation and confusion of many parents in the
West when it comes to the internet and its role in their children’s
lives, and then add to that dating, university life and career choices,
you come close to the generational dilemma. Parents who spent their own
early twenties labouring on remote farms have to deal with children who
measure their world in malls, iPhones and casual dates.
Older Chinese, especially those now in
their fifties or sixties, often seem like immigrants in their own
country. They have that same sense of disorientation, of struggling with
societal norms and mores they don’t quite grasp, and of clinging to
little alcoves of their own kind. In their relationships with their
children, they remind me of the parents of the Indian and Bangladeshi
kids I grew up with, struggling to advise their children about choices
they never had to make. Yet for all the dissonance that geographical
dislocation creates, the distance between a Bangladeshi village and a
Manchester suburb is, if anything, smaller than that between rural China
in the 1970s and modern Beijing.
Immigrants often have a stable set of values from their home culture
from which to draw sustenance, whether religious or cultural. But for
the children of the Cultural Revolution in China, there’s been no such
continuity. They were raised to believe in the revolutionary Maoism of
the 1960s and ‘70s, and then told as young adults in the late 1970s that
everything drilled into them in their adolescence had been a terrible
mistake. Then they were fed a trickle of socialism, rapidly belied by
the rush to get rich, and finally offered the hint of a liberal
counter-culture in the 1980s before Tiananmen snatched it away. In the
meantime, traditional values condemned as ‘counter-revolutionary’ in
their youth are being given a quick polish and propped up as the new
backbone of society by the authorities.
The young get slammed for their supposed materialism, but it’s a set
of values their parents hold more dearly still, since the one constant
source of security for their generation has been money. Money — at least
the fantasy of it — has never abandoned them. ‘The Chinese love money,’
the PhD student Zhang told me, ‘because it has no history’. Having gone
through the gangster capitalism of China’s rush to wealth, the older
generation’s bleakly amoral attitude toward how to get by can shock
their children. Huang Nubo, a poet, rock-climber and billionaire
property developer, now in his fifties, has been one of the few people
to talk about this openly, speaking of the ‘devastated social ecology’
in an interview with the Chinese magazine
Caixin. But Huang is a
rarity, and cushioned by his own wealth; far more parents are concerned
that their children aren’t doing enough to get on.
While immigrants dream of their children becoming doctors, lawyers,
or professors, domestic Chinese ambitions mostly lie elsewhere. Doctors
are poorly paid, overworked, and unpopular, thanks to a flailing and
corruption-ridden medical system. Lawyers are bound to the vagaries of
the ever-shifting judicial system. Professors earn marginal incomes and
rely on outside work to get by. The priority for Chinese parents isn’t
professional standing or public achievement, but money and security,
regardless of what the job involves.
Old makes way for new in Shanghai
Zhang is a fast-tracked young academic who regularly attends
high-level diplomatic and security conferences. (She was the only person
I talked to who asked to use a pseudonym, conscious of her own Google
sensitivity.) She said: ‘My mother can’t understand anything of what I
do, especially since it doesn’t come with any “perks”. Last new year, I
was home and my cousin was there too. He’s a pharmaceutical rep. What
that means is that he sells fake or overpriced drugs to hospitals, with
the collusion of the doctors, and they split the profits. And my mom
kept saying: “Oh, why don’t you go into business with your cousin! He
makes so much money!” She knows what his job involves but she never
thinks of it as wrong.’
Chinese parents pour money into their children’s education, but they
also spend on short cuts. Most can’t afford to do what one
acquaintance’s billionaire mining family did when he failed to get into
Tsinghua University: buy him citizenship in the Dominican Republic so
that he could attend Tsinghua as a ‘foreign student’, with cash as his
only qualification. But they could do as Zhang’s mother did, and bribe
her teachers every term to sit her at the front of the class, so that
she wouldn’t be lost among the other 50 or 60 students.
It’s still possible to forge a career in China based on merit, though
that’s becoming harder as the rich and well-connected pull the ladders
away. Take the arts, where just participating in a national-level dance
competition requires a minimum payment of 20,000 or 30,000 yuan
(approximately $3,000 to $5,000, in a country where average incomes for
urban residents are around $500 per month).
‘The actual winner is chosen by talent. But you need to fork over the
money to the judges to be in the running. So the girls either have to
rely on their daddies, or they have to find new “daddies”,’ a
21-year-old dancer told me. In music, one of the country’s top
conservatories, once an incubator for greatness, now requires students
to buy private classes from the director at 5,000 yuan ($800) a time. If
everyone else is playing dirty, even the most honest parents are left
with little choice for their children’s future, and some rue their own
idealism. Han Suzhen, 57, a retired schoolteacher, commented: ‘We didn’t
raise them in a way that adapts well to this world. We taught them
ideals that were instilled in us, a kind of innocence. But today
everybody is chasing the things we were taught not to value: we were
taught to give to society, now they’re taught to get for themselves in
any way possible. It’s the exact opposite. There’s nobody talking about
ideas or freedom.’
As has been the case for much of China’s history, the most attractive
prospect is an official job. On paper the salaries are low, but even an
unimportant job in the extended hierarchies of officialdom comes with
guaranteed benefits and security for life, known as the ‘iron rice
bowl’. A midlevel position is a licence for extortion and
string-pulling. Zhang told me: ‘My cousin, the drug dealer, keeps
pestering me. “Why don’t you become an official? Then I can tell my
business partners I have a relative who’s an official, and we can both
make money.”’
Jobs in one of the giant state-owned enterprises, such as the oil
behemoth Sinopec or the ‘big four’ banks, are the next best thing. These
state-backed jobs are also
tizhinei, ‘inside the system’, with
all the attendant perks of generous expense accounts, strong social
security and, at the right level, regular pay-offs. That’s why they come
with a price tag, whether in cash or in
guanxi, an everyday
Chinese term for influence, favour-trading and nepotism. Getting an
initial opening requires parental backing. When a list of candidates for
an entry-level job in a provincial state-owned enterprise was leaked
online in December, it included the most influential relatives of each
applicant.
Not every post can be bought. Li Xiang, a handsomely fey 25-year-old,
is in the middle of the examination and interview process to become a
central government official. ‘But it’s frustrating for me because my
parents both work for the central government,’ he said. ‘There’s a rule
that you can’t be in the same department as your immediate relation. The
central government application system is much cleaner than the local
government or the state-owned enterprises; you can’t buy or influence
your way in.’
He outlined the pros and cons of his move as we ate a pricey 400-yuan
steak meal. ‘It means a significant pay cut for me, from 10,000 in my
current job to maybe 6,000 yuan, after tax. The first year or two is on
probation, at 70 per cent of that. But the hospitals designated for
officials are the best, especially the central government. The job is
safe. Social security is strong. And I really do want to serve the
people. That’s why I applied for an advisory post to the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference [China’s largely rubber-stamp
parliament]. My parents were mad at me! They yelled at me for going for
a position without any power.’
Like Li, many of the post-1980 generation —
contrary to their reputation for greedy materialism — want to help
others. Levels of volunteering are higher than ever, though still
significantly lower than in the West, and college students or young
white-collar workers are the primary founders of NGOs. But to their
parents, charity can be a dirty word. ‘One of my friends has a sick
wife, and very little money,’ said Zhang, the PhD student. ‘I wanted to
give him 500 yuan to help him, but while I was waiting to meet him, I
could hear my mother’s voice in my head, telling me I was a fool. Every
time I give money to someone, I feel like I’m being cheated somehow.’
Another person I interviewed said: ‘If I tell my mum I gave money, she
berates me because I don’t even have an apartment of my own yet.’
Failing to support your elderly parents can get you a jail term
And for parents whose own dreams were frustrated by history, the
temptation to force their children into the path they wanted for
themselves is even stronger. When I first met Luo Jingqing, with her
confidence and air of slight world-weariness, I assumed she was older
than her real age of 24. We talked over lunch in Element Fresh, an
upmarket Shanghai-based chain popular with young professionals like her.
‘My mom wanted to be a professional woman,’ she told me. ‘She went to
a foreign languages high school to avoid having to be sent down to the
countryside [a Maoist policy of the 1950s to ‘70s whereby ‘educated
youth’ from the cities were sent to live among farmers]. It was that or
join the army. From there she was able to get herself into the
university, when it reopened, then after graduating she was assigned a
job at the Japanese embassy. She met my dad there later, when she was
27. They got married because he knocked her up, at least that’s what my
dad says. They’re divorced now.’
‘She always told me I ruined her life,’ Luo continued. ‘She’d tell me
never to have children, because they spoilt everything. She told me
that getting pregnant had wrecked her career, that it was my fault her
life had stalled and she had ended up trapped by my father. She started
telling me from as early as I can remember. Isn’t it ridiculous?’ She
laughed, as people sometimes will when telling you about terrors long
left behind. ‘But, really, she just wants me to be her, the person she
never managed to become. She wanted to be a doctor, so she really wanted
me to become one. I remember yelling at her, “I’m not what you want me
to be, and I never will be.”’
But trying to resist parental directives is tough. Ironically, one of
the few consistent ideas to survive all of China’s years of chaos has
been the extreme debt owed by children to parents, most clearly
articulated in Confucian philosophy but drummed in by a thousand
aphorisms and pious tales. ‘Filial piety is the root of all virtues,’ as
the saying goes. ‘Love what your parents love, respect what they
respect,’ instructs another. This burden weighs particularly hard upon
daughters. One typical morality manual issued by a Confucian nationalist
organisation in 1935 taught that ‘women are born with filial famine and
ethical debt. So the purpose of their lives is to clear that debt.’
No culture values the serpent’s tooth of a thankless child, but it’s
hard to imagine, in the modern West, a college dean getting front-page
media coverage for returning to his village to wash the feet of his
mother, or schoolchildren being made to practise kneeling to thank their
parents. Even the law backs this generational fealty; failing to
support your elderly parents can get you a jail term, though this, like
most Chinese laws that don’t directly benefit the government, is
vanishingly rarely enforced. There was even an attempt to make visiting
elderly parents mandatory.
These Confucian ideals have never matched reality. Chinese also has
its share of idioms about filial impiety, like the description of a
hypocrite as someone who ‘neglects his parents and gives them a rich
funeral’. And indeed, the old are frequently abandoned or neglected.
Next door, in prosperous South Korea, with the longest unbroken
Confucian culture in the world, the elderly are poorer, more likely to
still be working, and four times more likely to kill themselves than the
already suicide-prone Korean young. The suicide rate among older
Chinese lags just behind Korea’s, and has tripled in the past decade.
But in Korea and China alike, disobedience to parents is theoretically
held up as the worst of all possible sins.
Mah-jong, Shanghai 2012
Parental authority over children is often enforced with the crack of a
stick. One of the standard imprecations to small children is ‘I’ll beat
you to death!’ The concept of ‘Tiger mothers’ might have caused a fuss
in the West, prompted by Amy Chua’s notorious 2011 book
Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother.
But in response, much of the Chinese media feted ‘wolf dad’ Xiao
Baiyou, a Guangzhou businessman who wrote a book, originally called
Beat Them into Peking University
(2011), in which he smugly boasted of the atmosphere of totalitarian
sadism he imposed on his four children, including beating them for
arbitrary offences and denying them friends or play. In a French
restaurant in Beijing, Zhang, the fast-tracked PhD student, showed me
her calves, pitted with long white marks visible through her stockings.
‘They’re from when my mother used to cane me when I was little,’ she
said.
Family pressure is exacerbated by demographics. In the past, the
burden of parental expectations was spread between several siblings.
Today, the one-child policy has left the post-1980 generation at the
bottom of a suddenly inverted pyramid. This has hit the marginally
prosperous urban middle class the worst. In the countryside, family
planning was lax enough that most twentysomethings have one or two
siblings, while the rich were able to afford the fines to have a second
or third child, although sometimes widely spaced apart. But among young
white-collar workers, each couple has to bear the burden of two sets of
ageing parents, plus any grandparents tough enough to still be around.
And with social security shaky at best, parents look to their children
for security in old age.
Not surprisingly, the most visible manifestation of this is in buying
property. Only a minority can afford to buy property, but they buy it
young — at a median age of 27. The rural migrant workers who built
China’s new compounds will never be able to afford to live in their own
constructions, but most of the twentysomething white-collar workers I
know own their own Beijing apartments, usually costing somewhere between
1 and 3 million yuan, and bought on incomes of anywhere between 5,000
and 10,000 yuan a month.
‘I’d rather cry in a BMW than laugh on a bicycle’
The money comes from parents, who often pour their entire savings,
combined with cash borrowed from friends, other relatives, and sometimes
even illegal banks, into their child’s property in the capital. The
pooling process was given a boost after the financial crisis of 2008,
when the stock market plummeted while property remained white-hot. The
house ownership obsession has gripped both generations: it’s virtually
impossible, among the urban middle-classes, to get married without one
family providing a new flat for the couple.
‘Look at these,’ exclaimed a friend as we visited a book shop,
gesturing at the racks directed toward advice for the young. ‘All of
them say the same thing; marry and get an apartment by 27, settle down,
have kids. They’re a trap laid by our parents to get us to do what they
want.’ Chen Chenchen, a canny newspaper colleague of mine, didn’t see it
in such conspiratorial terms: ‘We’re becoming closer and closer to our
parents because we’re bound together by property, and we’re getting more
conservative as a result. At first, we thought we could afford to have
values. But then we realised our parents were right, and the iron rice
bowl is the golden rule. I resisted my parents pressuring me to buy a
Beijing apartment in 2008 [when she was 24] but succumbed in 2010, and
I’m glad I got it in time. Now we know that money is the most important
thing.’ Liu Juncheng, now 60 and a retired taxi driver, echoes this
sense of drifting towards a kind of parity. ‘It seems like our children,
like us, had a lot of hope for society, but that their views changed
real fast because of society; they got lost.’
But parental expectations can fray relationships further, too. ‘I
have a friend the same age as me,’ Luo the young professional said,
‘whose parents just paid the down-payment on her apartment. But her mom
has been staying with her since November, and she wants to stay on. It’s
a one-bedroom flat.’ Buying their children apartments isn’t just a
simple investment for parents, but a guarantee, at least in their minds,
of an old age spent in their children’s house. This was once an
expected social norm, eased by large households and communal families,
but with an increasing number of the elderly living alone, a financial
bond to their children’s property provides extra leverage.
Apartments are also an inextricable part of
the dating game, especially as people move into their mid-twenties.
Among the middle class, the parents of the groom are expected to provide
an apartment for the new couple to live in if one hasn’t become
available already. Like many renters, I’ve had more than one lease
broken after my landlord’s son set a wedding date. ‘We call boys “China
Construction Bank”, because you have to build for them, and girls “China
Merchant Bank” because you can sell them,’ commented my friend Min.
The media often deplore the commercialised nature of young love,
exemplified in 2010 by Ma Nuo, a contestant on a dating show; when asked
by an unemployed contender if she would ride with him on his bike, she
replied: ‘I’d rather cry in a BMW than laugh on a bicycle.’ It’s true
that the bling-laden snapshots of triumphant gold-diggers on dating
sites and boastful blogs are deeply off-putting. But the criteria that
parents give matchmakers, or advertise on placards that some of them
carry around parks at the weekend while looking for suitable spouses for
their unmarried offspring, are just as centred around salary, car and
apartment.
The love life of another friend, who uses the English name of Sally,
demonstrates the commercial and class realities of today’s dating scene.
Like many stories in China, hers sounds like a didactic Marxist fable
of the 1930s, except without the happy ending where the now liberated
woman joins the Communist Party. At university, Sally dated a rural boy
who was a student representative and, highly unusually, a sincere
believer in Communism. ‘He was so honest,’ she told me, ruefully. ‘He
wouldn’t even take pencils from the student council room to use for
himself.’
But he couldn’t live up to the standards that Sally and her parents
expected. She wanted a boyfriend who could buy her the phones and
handbags she aspired to, while her parents wanted someone from a wealthy
or well-connected family who could walk into a guaranteed career after
university. She soon dumped him and, helped by a new nose paid for by
her mother, snared a wealthy boy on campus.
A couple of years into the new relationship, however, she found the
positions reversed. After being introduced to her boyfriend’s parents,
his news was grim. ‘I can’t marry you,’ he told her bluntly. ‘My parents
expect me to marry a girl of my own class.’ But, he reassured her, he
was quite happy for her to be his mistress, and his multimillionaire
father had agreed to put aside the funds he would need to support her.
From a purely economic perspective, it was a deal that made sense.
Yet as well as security and comfort, Sally also wanted at least the
illusion of romance, not a nakedly commercial deal. So she broke off the
relationship and began looking again. ‘But I’ll be honest,’ she said
bleakly, ‘my mother told me: “Don’t think you can get that kind of boy
again, because you’re not a virgin any more.” I sold myself without
getting the best deal possible.’
Women are in an ambiguous position in the marriage market. The gender
imbalance caused by the one-child policy and gender-selective abortion,
resulting in 120 boys to 100 girls in some areas, favours them. But
they also face the barrier of being labelled ‘leftover women’ at 27, an
arbitrarily fixed target rigorously enforced by the older generation.
Even the All-China Women’s Federation, a supposedly feminist
organisation run largely by female officials aged over 50, publishes
articles on its website warning against the social dangers of unmarried
women and the terrible fate that awaits the 28-year-old singleton. ‘My
mother keeps calling me and reminding me I only have a couple more years
to find someone,’ commented a weary 25-year-old friend. ‘Of course, she
wants me to pick one of the boring losers she keeps trying to set me up
with.’
As soon as the sought-after wedding ring is in place, parental
pressure switches to the production of grandchildren. A wonderfully
cynical flowchart was circulated this Chinese New Year, showing the
barrage of demands and criticisms from relatives aimed at young people
returning home for the holiday. If you’re single, why aren’t you dating?
If you’re dating, why aren’t you married? If you’re married, why don’t
you have children? And if you have children, why aren’t they putting on a
show for us? When the child arrives, however, so do the in-laws,
producing even more friction as parents, baby, and grandparents cram
into a one-bedroom apartment.
Chinese expectations of marriage are often described as ‘traditional’
by the media, but they’re an odd mix of the post-Maoist quest for
security and the trappings of Western commercial romance — the diamond
ring, the white wedding dress. In response to social and parental
prodding toward placing material concerns first, some young Chinese have
invented a new term, ‘naked marriage,’ meaning getting wed purely for
love, without house, ring, ceremony or car. The idea promises romance,
but opinion is decidedly mixed, even from the young. A 2010 poll on
sohu.com found that the majority of young women opposed the idea, seeing
it as a way for men to dodge their responsibilities. Tellingly, the
majority of young men supported it.
‘My grandmother grew up in the 1930s and ‘40s, when China was much closer to the world, and so she understood how I see things’
It takes a certain grit to dodge convention altogether. Luo, the
young professional, saw no need to play the dating game at all, instead
living with a moderately impoverished foreigner in his mid-thirties. ‘My
mother has stopped pestering me about it, but I know she’d rather I was
looking for a conventional Chinese guy, with an apartment and a career.
My father says it’s OK because my boyfriend is English, not a Yankee or
a Jap. But I witnessed their whole miserable marriage, so I’m
pessimistic about men. I gave up any ambition for a family. I don’t have
the ability to give happiness to a kid. I can’t even take it on myself.
And I don’t want to have to think about how many houses to leave the
next generation.’
However, while the relationships between
the post-1980 generation and their parents are fraught with bitterness —
whether over careers, houses or marriage — the distance between them
and their grandparents is, curiously, much smaller. ‘My grandmother took
my ambitions to be a journalist seriously,’ said Lin Meilian. ‘And she
was the first person to teach me English, from when I was very small. I
had so much more in common with her than my mother.’
Lin continued: ‘My grandmother grew up in the 1930s and ‘40s, when
China was much closer to the world, and so she understood how I see
things.’ It was a sentiment widely echoed, and not just because of the
usual grandparental affections. The cosmopolitanism and potential of a
time before China closed its gates bridged generations, but so did the
willingness of grandparents to talk about their past.
Zhang told me how her grandfather had gone mad from persecution,
leaving her grandmother to raise four children by herself. ‘My
grandmother was a factory boss,’ Luo the young professional said, ‘so
she suffered during the Cultural Revolution. It’s funny, because
actually my grandfather was a landlord’s kid. He was carried to school
on the neck of a servant. He became a mid-ranking officer in the army,
but when the crowds came for my grandmother, he just blended into them.
Then they dragged her away and locked her in a “cowshed” [an improvised
prison] for the next few years.’
‘So your mother saw her own mother dragged away and betrayed by her husband when she was five or six?’ I asked.
‘I suppose she did. My grandfather just disappeared for years. There
were three children, and the oldest sister had to look after them all.
She was 14.’
This information had not come from Luo’s mother, who, like most of
her generation, had kept silent about her own suffering as a child.
During the Cultural Revolution, having the bad blood of intellectuals or
landlords meant schoolyard persecution, improvised beatings, less
rations, and being blocked from every opportunity. Turning in your
parents was never quite as fetishised as in the Soviet Union, with its
cult of the martyred schoolchild Pavlik Morozov, supposedly murdered by
his family in 1932 for denouncing his own father. But it happened. A
Chinese acquaintance of mine, now in his fifties, once described having
to kill his own brother to stop him turning in their parents for owning
banned books. Even if others might denounce them, children were made to
sign condemnations — ‘Even though she gave birth to me and is my mother,
she is a counterrevolutionary and is my enemy.’ Tens of millions
witnessed their parents being harassed, humiliated, beaten, imprisoned
or killed.
Li, the aspiring official, had a closer and healthier relationship
with his parents than anyone else I talked to, in part because he had
made the effort to understand them. ‘They struggled when they were my
age. They worked hard to become someone I [might later] respect. My mum
is from a really ordinary family, just workers, so she fought hard to
get into university. And my grandmother didn’t think she was good enough
for my dad. She really thought in class terms, even though she changed
her own name and moved north so as not to be persecuted in the Cultural
Revolution. She was the child of intellectuals, and her whole family was
in Shanghai. When she went back to try and find them, there was no
trace, all gone: parents, brothers, sisters, nieces and nephews.’
The worst story of parental abuse I heard came from a young woman who
asked for anonymity. I’ll call her Lily. Smart, successful, and pretty
in a fragile way, her relationship with her mother had been one of
constant maternal disdain or insult — she’d been called ugly, lazy,
stupid — culminating in an incident when she was 24. Lily received a
long letter from her mother which told her she was adopted, that her
various flaws proved that she wasn’t her mother’s child, and that this
was why her mother had been unable to love her, and never would. In
tears, Lily called her father and demanded to know why he had never told
her. ‘What are you talking about?’ he said, confused, ‘I was there when
you were born.’
Eventually. Lily’s mother half-admitted that the letter was a lie,
concocted in another fit of hatred and bitterness. But a seed of doubt
remained. The most convincing evidence of her real parentage, Lily
thought, was her curly hair. It came from her mother who was born in the
early 1960s to a widow who had a brief fling with a visiting Italian
Communist with an eye for opportunity.
‘So your mother grew up half-foreign and illegitimate, in the middle
of a witch-hunt for all things foreign,’ I said. ‘I can’t imagine how
hard that must have been for her.’
‘Maybe,’ Lily said. ‘We never talked about it.’
